The 13th session of the Council in March 2010 witnessed the adoption of all 16 reports from the 6th session of the UPR of December 2009, although not without controversy. Most notable was adoption of the report on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the State’s failure to accept a single recommendation, setting the harmful precedent of allowing States to fall back on ‘noting’ all recommendations without any explanation. One other disruption of note related to Cyprus allegation that it had ‘not been treated by its peers [that is, Turkey] in accordance with the principles of the UPR’, although this ultimately did not affect the adoption of its UPR report.
Only six of the 16 States under review submitted written responses to pending recommendations. Concerning presentations by States under review, there were varying levels of follow-up to specific pending recommendations, from zero (DPRK) to relatively comprehensive in the case of the Dominican Republic, for example, while all of the six States that provided written responses were also in a position to elaborate on certain points.
Comments by member and observer States were dominated in almost all instances by Algeria, Cuba and the United States, with the latter using the opportunity to note efforts of improvement, to raise concern with specific human rights issues, and to address specific recommendations in the UPR report, while Cuba and Algeria tended to present rhetorical statements commending most SuRs for all of their efforts. Most other States continued to use the allocated space to broadly commend their allies, with little attention to following up on their own recommendations.
General comments by NGOs were generally more substantive and critical in their content, notably in the cases of Human Right Watch on the DPRK, the International Commission of Jurists on the DRC, and the Lutheran World Federation on Bhutan. Such comments moved Ethiopia to refer to Human Rights Watch as ‘known Ethiopia bashers’. Bhutan also criticised the level of international NGO engagement, which it claimed was influenced by ‘politically motivated sources’, and sought assistance for domestic NGO representation. The dialogue was dominated by international organizations and, thematically, NGOs dealing with rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons tended to be most visible, as in the past.
The general debate on Item 6 was notable for the sizeable increase in participation of both States and NGOs from the previous general debate, possibly linked to the fact the UPR has now reached its halfway point, combined with the fact that that the March session constitutes the ‘main’ session of the Council. The debate provided a good opportunity for a number of States to outline what they saw as the priority areas for review of the UPR in 2011. Among the more detailed were Nigeria (on behalf of the African Group), which prioritised the sharing of best practice, the disbursement of funds from the voluntary fund, and resolving the non-availability of reports in all languages; India, which stressed the need to address the anomaly of the speakers list expeditiously through a decision of the Council, rather than wait for an ‘ideal solution’; Norway, which stressed that the clear acceptance and rejection of recommendations needed to be assured; and Israel and Canada, who both criticised the rejection of recommendations on the alleged basis of not being factually correct or in accordance with national law or practice. Canada also drew important attention to ‘efforts by some States to orchestrate a white wash of their human rights record by attempting to stack the speakers lists in the working group and plenary with friendly States or government-organised NGOs’.
NGOs also used the general debate to draw attention to areas requiring future improvement, including the rejection of recommendations based on treaty obligations, clarification of accepted and rejected recommendations, strengthening national consultations after UPR reviews, and fixing the speakers lists.
A small number of States also used the general debate to update the Council on the status of implementation of recommendations. Most notable was a grid document circulated by the United Kingdom detailing specific advancements in fulfilling recommendations, including in relation to a child poverty bill before Parliament, age discrimination, domestic violence, and counter terrorism. Colombia also explained that it has put an action plan in place, reflected in a public document that is regularly updated. The United States, on the other hand, used the general debate to inform States of its planning for the UPR, including 10 public meetings to date and a website to receive comments from any stakeholders.
The US also used the debate to express its concern that the DPRK had not acted faithfully by not clarifying its position on outstanding recommendations, prompting the DPRK to interject that the US had no right to reopen the review (to which the President overruled that the content of their comments was admissible as it related to ‘process’), and to then exercise two rights of reply denouncing the US for challenging its national sovereignty. In so doing, it confirmed its unwillingness to admit that it had not accepted a single UPR recommendation.
Overall, the general debate proved useful as a means to provide follow up and as a measurement of States’ initial priorities in relation to improving (as they interpret it) the functioning of the UPR.
